

## BOOK REVIEWS

essays, they serve as a strong reminder of certain large gaps in value theory, and thus of the need for further research both external and internal to preference theories. Externally, further investigation is obviously needed of how values and reasons might be grounded independently of preferences. Internally, the questions prompted by these essays indicate that more exploration is needed of the limits of preference theories themselves. Broome's problem of fine individuation, for instance, may seem to pose only a bare theoretical challenge to preference theories: most people's preferences are simply not so fine-grained. How damaging would it be to moderate Humeanism if the ability of decision theory to constrain preferences depended partly on contingent facts about our systems of preference? Could a corrected preference view incorporate something akin to Broome's rational principles of indifference? Sumner's arguments invite the question whether preference theorists might succeed in delimiting a subset of preferences that could properly be identified with a person's well-being. Finally, Copp's picture of how needs figure in practical reasoning is intriguing, yet a question remains about whether needs can be encompassed within a preference theory. Although the status of something as a basic need may not depend on its being desired, the status of the reasons furnished by needs may depend on a connection to desire. Those things that we need will also (generally) be those things for which we have especially stable and strong desires. If this were not so, it seems unlikely that needs could provide the potent considerations in practical reasoning that Copp depicts them as providing.

The foregoing remarks, of course, do not begin to cover the many issues explored in and raised by the essays in this volume. It should be of real interest to anyone working in the relevant areas of value theory.

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*LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW, POLITICS AND MORALITY*. By GERALD C. MACCALLUM JR. Ed. MARCUS G. SINGER and REX MARTIN. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993. Pp. xxxii, 277.

Gerald MacCallum taught philosophy at the University of Wisconsin from 1961 until 1977. The stroke he suffered in that year prevented him from further teaching. He continued to write, even through the crippling effects of a second stroke, until his death in 1987. His final project was the Prentice Hall Foundations in Philosophy book, *Political Philosophy*. The present collection brings together papers, published and unpublished, spanning his writing career. I hope in this short space to convey some bigger, largely

