Philosophy
David Christensen
Professor of Philosophy, Director of Undergraduate Studies
Corliss Brackett 306
Office Hours
Mondays 1:30-3:30 (drop-in), and other times by appointment
Biography
David Christensen received his Ph.D. from UCLA in 1987 and taught for 20 years at the University of Vermont before coming to Brown in 2007. His main research interests are in epistemology (formal and informal).
His book, Putting Logic in its Place, investigates the role of logic in constraining rational beliefs and degrees of confidence. He's also written papers on this topic and others, such as: What determines whether a given bit of evidence supports or refutes a given theory? Can thinking about the meanings of our words help us resist skepticism? Does the fact that one believes something provide some justification for continuing to believe it? How should one's beliefs be affected by one's knowing that other people, who are equally informed, rational and intelligent, believe differently?
Christensen is currently working on questions about how our theory of rational belief should in general accommodate one's doubts about one's own cognitive reliability.
Publications
- “Akratic (Epistemic) Modesty,” Philosophical Studies (2020) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01536-6
- "The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2020) https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12712
- “Formulating Independence” , in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays edited by M. S. Rasmussen and A. Steglich-Petersen, Oxford University Press (2019)
- “On Acting as Judge in One’s Own (Epistemic) Case,” Marc Sanders Lecture, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (2018)
- "Disagreement, Drugs, etc: from Accuracy to Akrasia" , Episteme (2016): 397-422 https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2016.20
- "Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity " , Noûs 50, 3 (2014): 584-603 https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12077
- "Disagreement and Public Controversy", in Essays in Collective Epistemology, edited by Jennifer Lackey, Oxford University Press (2014)
- "Epistemic Modesty Defended", in The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, edited by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, Oxford University Press (2013)
- "Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism", Philosophers’ Imprint 11, (6) (2011) https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/phimp/3521354.0011.006/1
- "Rational Reflection", Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010), 121-140 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00187.x
- "Higher-Order Evidence", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2010), 185-215 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00366.x
- "Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy", Philosophy Compass 4 (2009), 756-67 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x
- "Epistemic Self-Respect", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (2007), 319-337 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00224.x
- "Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals", Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2 (2007), 3-31
- "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News", Philosophical Review 116 (2007), 187-217 https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-035
- "Three Questions about Leplin's Reliabilism", Philosophical Studies 134 (2007), 43-50 https://rdcu.be/ct1qt
- "Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism", Philosophy of Science 68 (2001), 356-76 https://doi.org/10.1086/392889
- "Diachronic Coherence vs. Epistemic Impartiality", Philosophical Review 109 (2000), 349-71 https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-3-349
- "Measuring Confirmation", Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999), 437-61 https://doi.org/10.2307/2564707
- "What is Relative Confirmation?" Noûs 31 (1997), 370-84 https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00050
- "Testimony, Memory, and the Limits of the A Priori", Philosophical Studies 86 (1997), 1-20 (with Hilary Kornblith) https://rdcu.be/ct1qr
- "Dutch Books Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers", Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996), 450-79 https://doi.org/10.2307/2940893
- "Critical Study of Robert Nozick's The Nature of Rationality", Noûs 29 (1995), 259-74 https://doi.org/10.2307/2215662
- "Conservatism in Epistemology", Noûs 28 (1994), 69-89m https://doi.org/10.2307/2215920
- "Switched-Words Skepticism: a Case Study in Semantical Anti-Skeptical Argument", Philosophical Studies 71 (1993), 33-58 (Springer) https://rdcu.be/ct1qb
- "Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993), 301-21 https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107770
- "Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology", Philosophy of Science 59 (1992), 540-57 https://doi.org/10.1086/289694
- "Causal Powers and Conceptual Connections", Analysis 52 (1992), 163-68 https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/52.3.163
- "Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs", Philosophical Review 100 (1991), 229-47 https://www.jstor.org/stable/2185301
- "The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping", Philosophy of Science 57 (1990), 644-62 https://doi.org/10.1086/289584
- "Glymour on Evidential Relevance", Philosophy of Science 50 (1983), 471-81 https://doi.org/10.1086/289130