Joshua Schechter, Chair
Biography
Josh Schechter received his Ph.D. from New York University in 2006. He has taught at Brown since 2005. His research ranges from epistemology, to metaethics, to the philosophy of logic, to technical issues in logic itself.
Much of his work concerns the epistemology of logic and inferential reasoning—including the development of accounts of the justification of our logical beliefs and basic inferential practices and an explanation of our reliability about these matters. Additional work concerns the epistemology of other a priori domains, notably moral belief; the rationality of mental states other than beliefs such as emotions and desires; and the nature of logic and validity. He also works on general issues in epistemology—for instance, on the theoretical significance of the a priori/a posteriori distinction and on the question of which epistemological statuses (e.g., knowledge, justification, or rational credence) are primary.
Schechter was the recipient of a George A. and Eliza Gardner Howard Foundation Fellowship in 2019, an External Faculty Fellowship at the University of Connecticut Humanities Institute in 2015-16, an NEH Summer Stipend in 2009, and a Visiting Fellowship at New College, Oxford University, in Spring 2009.
Recent seminar topics have included the nature of logic, the metaphysics and epistemology of modality, inquiry, skepticism, non-causal explanation, moral epistemology, the epistemological significance of etiology, and the a priori.
Publications
- "The Theoretical Significance of the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction", forthcoming in Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), The A Priori: Its Significance, Sources, and Extent, Oxford.
- “Epistemic Characterizations of Validity and Level-Bridging Principles”, Philosophical Studies (2024) 181(1): 153-78.
- “Etiological Debunking Beyond Belief”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics (2024) 19: 274-98.
- “A Liar-Like Paradox for Rational Reflection Principles”, Analysis (2024) 84(2): 292-300.
- "Supervaluationism, Modal Logic, and Weakly Classical Logic", Journal of Philosophical Logic (2024) 53(2): 411-61.
- "Five Kinds of Epistemic Arguments Against Robust Moral Realism", Paul Bloomfield and David Copp (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism (2023), Oxford, pp. 345-369.
- "Internalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods", Nikolaj Jang Pedersen and Peter Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement (2020), Oxford, pp. 254-78.
- "Aiming at Aptness", Episteme (2019) 16: 438-52.
- "Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought: The Epistemology of Basic Deductive Rules", Brendan Balcerak Jackson and Magdalena Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking (2019), Oxford, pp. 152-77.
- "Explanatory Challenges in Metaethics", Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics (2018), Routledge, pp. 443-58.
- "Is There a Reliability Challenge for Logic?", Philosophical Issues (2018), Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning 28: 325-347.
- "Difficult Cases and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Belief", Oxford Studies in Metaethics (2017) 12: 27-50.
- "No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion", J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon, and Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind (2017), Oxford, pp. 132-59.
- "Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability about Logic?", Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 (2013), 214–239
- "Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure", Philosophical Studies 163 (2) (2013), 428–452. This paper was selected for the Philosophers' Annual, volume 31
- "Juxtaposition: A New Way to Combine Logics", The Review of Symbolic Logic 4(4) (2011), 560–606
- "Weakly Classical Theories of Identity", The Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4) (2011), 607–644
- "The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic", Philosophical Perspectives, Epistemology 24(2010), 437–464
- "How are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?" (with David Enoch), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3) (2008), 547–579
- "Hawthorne's Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief" (with Christopher Hill), Philosophical Issues (2007) 17, The Metaphysics of Epistemology, 102–122 (slightly expanded PDF)
- "Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens" (with David Enoch), Noûs (2006) 40 (4) 687–715
- "Luck, Rationality, and Explanation", expanded version of a commentary on Adam Elga's "Lucky to be Rational" delivered at the 2008 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference
- "Deductive Reasoning", The Encyclopedia of the Mind (2013) edited by Hal Pashler, SAGE Reference, 226–230
- "Review of Grounding Concepts by C. S. Jenkins", Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2010)